ABSTRACT. Despite Congressional and Presidential emphasis on reducing bundling and consolidation of defense contracts, recent research studies cast doubt on whether bundling and consolidation are problems for small defense contractors or for the defense acquisition system as a whole. On the contrary, those studies proposed that bundling and consolidation ought to be validated as legitimate tools to achieve best value for defense buyers. This paper tests these propositions by examining U.S. Department of the Navy (DON) bundled and consolidated contracts for FY2010, the record year for bundling and consolidation in U.S. defense contracting. Specifically, the paper examines the effect of bundling and consolidation on performance of Navy and Marine Corps buying commands in meeting small business goals, as well as on good-government policy objectives such as competition, performance-based acquisition, preference for commercial suppliers, and support for the U.S. defense industrial base. The paper concludes by recommending the Secretary of the Navy's Office of Small Business Program (SECNAV OSBP) seven new strategies for challenging bundling and consolidation. Such strategies will enable SECNAV OSBP to improve not only DON performance on small business goals, but also the defense acquisition system as a whole.
INTRODUCTION
Bundling and consolidation of purchasing requirements into largedollar, large-scope, large-geography contacts is commonly regarded as a major barrier to entry into the Federal, and especially the Department of Defense (DOD), procurement market. (HASC 2012 , Kidalov 2011 . Since 1997, Congress and Presidential administrations have championed a series of major laws and regulatory initiatives to reduce bundling and consolidation. (Kidalov 2011) . While earlier research strongly supported the need for antibundling initiatives in order to enhance small business opportunities and promote competition (SBA Advocacy 2004) , some recent studies cast doubt on whether consolidation and bundling are problems for small business contractors. (Moore 2008 , Nerenz 2007 , GAO 2004 . In particular, two recent studies suggested bundling and consolidation may be positive or even best-practice purchasing activities with major benefits for the defense acquisition system or supplier base. (Moore 2008 , Nerenz 2007 . With support from the Secretary of the Navy's Office of Small Business Programs (SECNAV OSBP), my study attempts to resolve the conflict among these studies by analyzing Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) data on bundled and consolidated contracts awarded by the Department of the Navy (DON) during Fiscal Year 2010. That year, reported bundling and consolidation in defense contracting reached a recent record of 224 contracts worth $21.1 billion, (HASC 2012) , of which the DON share was 44 contracts (about 20 percent) worth well over $0.8 billion (about 4 percent). My study addresses these contracts' features, the buying commands' actions, and those commands' records on achieving small business contracting goals.
BUNDLING AND CONSOLIDATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Contract bundling and consolidation are regulated by a complementary legal framework. Initially, contract bundling was recognized as an implied cause of action invoked under the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 to protest contract solicitations as unduly restrictive of competition. (Kidalov 2011) . Eventually, beginning with the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 and continuing with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress passed and Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush signed two laws establishing specific criteria to limit and regulate bundling and consolidation. (Kidalov 2011 , Manuel 2010 .) (This study does not address the effects of any post-FY2010 legislative or regulatory changes.) The legal concepts of bundling and consolidation substantially overlap, although "the rules that apply to bundling are more restrictive." (DOD OSBP 2007) . "In the most general terms, for DOD, a consolidation is the combining of two or more previous contracts into a single solicitation, and a bundled contract is a consolidation that is unsuitable for award to a small business as a prime contractor even though one or more of the previous contracts was performed (or could have been performed) by a small business. To put it another way, a solicitation that consolidates requirements does not always bundle them, but a solicitation that bundles requirements always consolidates them." (DOD OSBP 2007) .
The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, codified in the Small Business Act at 15 U.S.C. § 632, defines a "bundled contract" as "a contract that is entered into to meet requirements that are consolidated in a bundling of contract requirements." In turn, this statute defines "bundling of contract requirements" as "consolidating 2 or more procurement requirements for goods or services previously provided or performed under separate smaller contracts into a solicitation of offers for a single contract that is likely to be unsuitable for award to a small-business concern due to-(A) the diversity, size, or specialized nature of the elements of the performance specified; (B) the aggregate dollar value of the anticipated award; (C) the geographical dispersion of the contract performance sites; or (D) any combination of the factors described in subparagraphs (A), (B) , and (C)." The term "separate smaller contract" is further defined as "a contract that has been performed by 1 or more small business concerns or was suitable for award to 1 or more small business concerns." Factors specified in the Act as those "that might cause unsuitability for award to small business" include "the diversity, size, or specialized nature" of performance called for in the contract, the total dollar value of the contract, the geographic spread of performance, or a combination of these factors. (U.S. . "Substantial bundling" of defense contracts at over $7.5 million requires identification of alternative buying strategies and additional reviews. (FAR 7.104 2010) .
The contract consolidation law, Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, codified at 10 U.S.C. §2382 (2010) and implemented by DFARS 207.170-3 (2009) , is not focused on prior performance by small businesses. It simply prohibits consolidation of two or more "contract requirements" totaling over $5.5 million unless the senior procurement executive of a defense agency conducts market research, identifies alternatives involving "lesser degrees of consolidation," and determines that consolidation is necessary and justified. Section 2382 defines "consolidation of contract requirements" and "consolidation" as "a use of a solicitation to obtain offers for a single contract or a multiple award contract to satisfy two or more requirements of that [military] department, agency, or activity for goods or services that have previously been provided to, or performed for, that department, agency, or activity under two or more separate contracts smaller in cost than the total cost of the contract for which the offers are solicited." (U.S. DFARS 2010) .
Both the bundling and the consolidation statutes allow defense buyers to determine that bundling or consolidation was "necessary and justified" if they identified "measurably substantial benefits" from bundling, or if benefits from consolidation "substantially exceed[ing]" benefits from alternatives to consolidation. (U.S. Code 2010). In both statutes, justification criteria are qualitatively identical and include cost, quality, acquisition cycle efficiencies, improved terms and conditions, and any other benefits. The difference is that bundling benefits must generally be dollarized to between 5 and 10 percent of contract value, unless senior acquisition officials determine that the acquisition strategy is mission critical and provides for maximum practicable small business participation (FAR 7.107 2009) . Section 2382 does not require dollarized benefits. Both statutes specify that administrative or personnel costs alone do not justify bundling unless they are at least 10 percent of contract value, or unless they are "substantial" in relation to the consolidated contract value. (U.S. (Moore, et al. 2008 .) The Moore study observed that consolidation/bundling "practices may have mixed results for small-business opportunities, reducing the number of small businesses receiving prime contracts but possibly providing them the same total dollars." (Moore, et al. 2008) . The Moore study also cited the Nerenz (2006 Nerenz ( -2007 study, which found that contract bundling was protested at less than 2 percent of all bid protests filed at the GAO during the years 1995-2004. Both the Moore and the Nerenz studies suggested that the SBA Advocacy study was drastically over-inclusive. Nerenz also noted that the SBA Advocacy study used a broad extra-statutory definition of bundling. (Nerenz 2007) . The GAO 2004 report found that DOD awarded almost 3,400 FY2002 contracts which exceeded its substantial bundling threshold, accounting for over 75 percent of DOD prime contracting dollars. However, the GAO was able to validate bundling designation for only 8, and did not provide their dollar value or share of DOD contracts. (GAO 2004 This proposition reflects current law, as noted above. Its strongest proponent was the Nerenz article, which suggested that all bundling not protested by small businesses and/or not approved by the SBA was at least presumptively proper and so properly excluded small firms. (Nerenz 2007) . The 2004 GAO study did not address this proposition, simply finding that most agencies reported that they did not engage in bundling. (GAO 2004) . The SBA Advocacy study challenged this proposition only indirectly. It defined a bundled contract simply as one that "incorporates dissimilar activities" and lowered the definition of a substantially bundled contract to $1 million, but did not address when such contracts may be justified or necessary. (SBA Advocacy, 2002) . As a result, Advocacy included a substantial volume of contracts awarded to small businesses into its data of bundled contracts -thereby showing that small firms have the capabilities to perform at least some combined requirements. On the other hand, the Moore study suggested that small businesses were excluded from consolidated DOD contracts because of large firms' capabilities to meet customer needs such as PerformanceBased/Life-Cycle Logistics on service contracts, "systems-of-systems" engineering in weapons contracts, and business choices of major aerospace and defense manufacturers to outsource work. The Moore study recommended that DOD "may wish to consider where small businesses can best contribute to innovation, including at Tier 1 or lower-level suppliers." (Moore, et al. 2008 ).
Proposition 3: Except for Alleged Problems for Small Businesses, Contract Bundling and Consolidation Provide an Overall
Benefit to the Defense Acquisition System. The Moore study was the strongest proponent of this proposition. It asserted that contract bundling is driven by two influences of commercial practices used by the industry to enhance efficiencies and improve performance. "The first, prevalent in supply chain purchases, is . . . achieving superior quality, responsiveness, and lower total costs through supply chain transformation. . . . [A]s manufacturers have sought to reduce waste through "lean" practices such as minimal inventory, "just-in-time" supply, and use of fewer, larger, and more complex assemblies, they have also sought to use a smaller, more stable supply base that is well integrated with product design and synchronized with manufacturing. . . . Leading commercial firms, and the federal government, have similarly sought to develop strategic sourcing . . Focusing on longer-term relationships with these suppliers can also improve quality in the supply chain." (Moore, et al. 2008) . "The second influence on commercial practices is the grouping of goods and services together into one offering, particularly as a company's goods become more like commodities with lower profits and their services (e.g., repairs) for these goods become more profitable." Such contract structure, supposedly, "guarantees a level of operational performance and charges the customer a fee based on the hours" the manufactured product is used. "Similarly, the DoD may expect its leading suppliers to offer more goods and services grouped together for purchase such as those it seeks for performance-based logistics." (Moore 2008 ). As stated above, the Moore study concluded that these commercial practices lead DOD to adopt Performance-Based Logistics, Strategic Sourcing, Total Life Cycle Systems Management, and similar measures to cut costs and increase performance of government contractors, and claimed that "best practices" in the area of cost-cutting and performance were are odds with increased small business participation. The Moore study called on DOD to track consolidation in the private sector so as to explain or justify consolidation in DOD contracts. (Moore, et al. 2008 .)
The contrary position was taken by the SBA Advocacy study, which asserted that "the growing lack of diversity and stratification in the federal industrial base being fueled by bundling will have long term and detrimental consequences to the government's ability to procure needed services and supplies at competitive prices." (SBA Advocacy 2004). However, this assertion was not specifically tested in terms of analyzing the impact of bundling on competition or performance across the acquisition system. The 2004 GAO study, similarly, did not address systemic effects of bundling, but claimed that FPDS data was not accurate or sufficient to do so. (GAO 2004.) On the other hand, Nerenz argued that low bid protests filings challenging bundled contracts government-wide (less than 5 in the years [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] in comparison with the annual rate of protests filed (1,300 to almost 3,000 per year) showed either that bundling was extremely rare or that all bundling that was not protested was appropriate and useful. (Nerenz 2007 $7,183,482,758.10 $6,043,542,233.92 $1,091,532,717.39 15.20% SPAWAR SAN DIEGO $2, 616, 862, 292.52 $2, 434, 239, 814.78 $181, 038, 679.74 6.92% NAVSUP WEAP SYS SUPPORT PHILA $1, 944, 930, 431.48 $1, 875, 723, 849.15 $60, 103, 423.73 3.09%
NAVSEA HQ WDC $16, 910, 837, 271.37 $15, 749, 252, 023.89 $474, 239, 900 $230, 422, 259.81 $229, 535, 685.16 $815, 763.12 0.35% NAVAIR SYS COM PAX RIVER $19, 171, 866, 231.98 $19, 107, 361, 076.94 $59, 002, 646.98 0.31% SUBTOTAL: BUNDLING OR CONSOLIDATION COMMANDS $58, 875, 608, 392.95 $52, 910, 139, 310.22 $4, 526, 732, 763.62 Second, data shows that small businesses have the capability to perform about 83 percent of bundled and consolidated Navy contracts. A key de facto measure of small business capability are the SBA size standards, which are measured on either employee or revenue basis and are assigned to each North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) category. Since 1997, Contracting Officers have relied on SBA's size standards tied to the North American Industrial Classification System ("NAICS") "to determine the type of industry in which a company is participating." (Kidalov 2011) . Specifically: Under SBA regulations, Contracting Officers are responsible for choosing the NAICS code that best describes the "principal purpose" of the product or service acquired. The basis for this decision is subject to a complex six-factor test, which includes (1) "industry descriptions" in the NAICS Manual, (2) description of the product or service in solicitation documents, (3) "value and importance" of the procurement's components, (4) functions of products and services procured, (5) prior procurement classifications in similar purchases, and (6) the purposes of the Small Business Act. A procurement is usually classified according to the component that accounts for the greatest percentage of contract value. (Kidalov 2011) . Each NAICS code has a matching small business size standard based on either employment or revenue. "SBA's employee-based caps are calculated prior to each representation or certification of small business size based on the average number of employees for each pay period "over the preceding 12 months." (Kidalov 2011 ). Parttime or temporary employees count the same as full-time employees. Total average employees of all entities considered affiliated with the enterprise that have been employed by those affiliates over the preceding twelve-month period (even if affiliation arose more recently) are included in the count." (Kidalov 2011 Benefits from Bundling and Consolidation. As stated above, Congress required Federal agencies to obtain a 5 to 10 percent premium in "measurably substantial benefits" from contract bundling or to prove "substantially exceeding" benefits from consolidation. It is DOD policy to "strongly encourage" its buyers "to quantify the benefits" regardless of whether contract is bundled or consolidated. (DOD OSBP 2007). Thus, on over $831 million in bundled and consolidated contracts, the expected benefits should have been valued at over $77.7 million. No agency files were checked to examine whether these benefits have been documented. However, over 71 percent of these benefits would have been expected from contracts which individual small firms could perform, and another over 12 percent would have been expected from contracts which teams up to 3 small firms could perform. Without reviewing contract files, it is hard to assume that large firms provided the kind of benefits on over 83 percent of bundled and consolidated contracts value that small firms could not have also provided. A contrary outcome is much more plausible. Figure 14 . Projected value of expected benefits from bundling and consolidation.
CONCLUSION: OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The above analysis of FY2010 DON bundled and consolidated contracts casts serious doubts on the validity of three key propositions advanced in recent studies of bundling and consolidations in the DOD. As to the proposition that consolidation is not a major obstacle for small firms seeking defense contracts, data shows that commands which were responsible for two-thirds of consolidation and bundling were anchors weighing down DON's achievement of small business goals. Data also shows that the SBA/OFPP methodology vastly understated the exclusionary impact of bundling and consolidation on small businesses. As to the proposition that small firms are legitimately excluded from consolidated contracts because they lack the capability to perform the military's needs, data shows that small firms were capable to perform the vast majority of such contracts spending awarded by the DON. Data also shows that only a small portion of consolidated requirements likely involved so-called private sector "best practices." As to the proposition that consolidation and bundling benefit the defense acquisition system, data shows that bundling and consolidation seriously undermines fundamental principles such as paying for performance, competition, preference for use of commercial terms and suppliers, and support for the U.S. defense industrial base. With regards to the defense industrial base, contract consolidation may have been driven by barriers to entry created by foreign governments hosting DON bases or ships. Finally, because small firms were found capable to perform most bundled or consolidated contracts, the expected value of benefits to the taxpayers from consolidation is highly questionable.
Of course, further research would be necessary to determine how these data trends hold across time.
These findings suggest innovative new strategies which SECNAV OSBP can employ to reduce bundling and consolidation. First, DON small business performance can drastically improve should SECNAV OSBP begin to annually track top bundling and consolidation commands with additional oversight. Second, to enable easier finding of capable small firms, teams, or mentor-protégé arrangements, SECNAV OSBP should create a simplified size standards-to-contracts value conversion chart where all size standards are expressed in dollars. Third, SECNAV OSBP should amend the Navy-Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS) to ensure review by the Navy Competition Advocate General of most contracts which are both not competed and are bundled or consolidated. Fourth, SECNAV OSBP should amend NMCARS to ban or strictly limit the ability of buying commands not to use Performance-Based Acquisition terms and procedures on all bundled and consolidated services contracts. Fifth, SECNAV OSBP should amend NMCARS to strictly limit not using commercial item terms and procedures on eligible bundled or consolidated contracts. Sixth, SECNAV OSBP should amend NMCARS to require consideration of impact on U.S. defense industrial base when foreign firms receive bundled or consolidated contracts. Seventh, SECNAV OSBP should review, revise, or enforce international trade and defense agreements to reduce trade barriers and help U.S. firms get work on U.S. own bases overseas. These strategies will not only result in greater small business participation, but will also enable DON to achieve broad systemic improvements in defense acquisitions.
